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China’s Inroads into Central, Eastern,  
and South Eastern Europe 
Implications for Germany and the EU
Jacopo Maria Pepe
China’s increased engagement in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe has 
aroused concerns in Europe that China is pursuing a divisive strategy. Its primary 
goal, however, is to use the region as a gateway to Western Europe’s markets while 
including the EU in its own Eurasian integration project; in Beijing’s view, a robust 
regulatory EU is doubtless preferable to a fragmented Europe. China’s deepening 
involvement in the region could nevertheless increase economic divisions within 
the EU as whole. As a trade triangle emerges involving China, Germany, and the 
Visegrad states, the “German-Central European manufacturing core” potentially 
stands to gain at the expense of the EU’s Atlantic and southern European member 
states. Germany must address this risk with a triple strategy that balances national 
interest, EU cohesion, and engagement with China. This involves, first, working 
with the Visegrad Four, with other European countries, and with EU institutions to 
forge a deeper and more effective cooperation with China to enhance transport 
connectivity and economic modernization, particularly in the Western and Eastern 
Balkans. Second, Germany should increase pressure on China to open up the 
Chinese domestic market to ensure mutual access. And third, it should promote 
forward-looking European industrial policy centered on the digitalization of value 
and supply chains for Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe. This would 
allow Germany to prevent intra-European divisions from deepening, while taking 
advantage of its triangular relations with China and the countries of Central Europe 
and fostering mutually advantageous integration across Eurasia.
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Introduction
In November 2016, China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang 
attended the Fifth China-Central Eastern Europe Sum-
mit. In his remarks, he proposed the intensification of 
“pragmatic cooperation” between China and the countries 
of Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and South Eastern 
Europe (here CEE) to expand two-way trade, transport 
connectivity, industrialization, and financial cooperation. 
His speech reaffirmed both China’s interest in the region 
and its support for the European integration process.1 
To many European observers, however, China’s 
engagement in CEE remains ambiguous, and to some, it 
already seemed outright suspicious by the time the coop-
eration had gathered steam in 2012. Indeed, since then, 
China’s trade and investment activities in CEE have raised 
questions about China’s goals and strategy  toward the 
EU at large. For instance, shortly after the launch of the 
forum’s secretariat in 2012, the EU expressed its skepti-
cism about a move that was largely seen as an attempt to 
further “bilateralize” relations with the EU. As the EU’s 
then high representative for foreign policy Catherine Ash-
ton put it at the time, the CEE initiative carried the risk 
that China-EU relations could take place on two levels: at 
the EU level and at the bilateral level.2 Today, increasingly 
tense relations between China and individual EU member 
states – particularly Germany – over China’s acquisitions 
of high-technology assets have given new momentum 
to the idea that China is pursuing a “divide and conquer” 
strategy, one that, by engaging individual countries bilat-
erally, aims to acquire national technological and indus-
trial assets while bypassing EU regulations.3 According to 
this logic, the CEE-China cooperation framework could 
well be considered part of this divisive strategy.
In fact, rather than aiming to divide the EU, China’s 
strategy in CEE has from the beginning been to pursue 
greater engagement with the EU as a whole using CEE 
as a cooperation platform.4 This was stressed in the Riga 
Declaration that concluded the Fifth China-CEE Summit 
in November 2016: “All participating EU member states 
reaffirm that the implementation of the actions envisaged 
by this document must be done without prejudice to the 
competencies of the European Union and with respect for 
the obligations stemming from their membership of the 
European Union.”5 
Five years after the launch of the “16+1” Initiative, 
China has indeed become increasingly aware that the 
region is too complex and inhomogeneous – and China’s 
experience with it not yet extensive enough – to exclude 
the EU, even if relations with the EU may become more 
complicated. This said, risks of a “division” of Europe – 
both across the member states and between CEE and the 
rest of the EU – should be taken into greater consideration 
today. It is possible that the EU may further prove unable 
to approach China in this region with a comphrehensive 
strategy of its own that takes into consideration struc-
tural changes both inside the EU and in Eurasia at large. 
In fact, the impact on the EU of the 16+1 initiative (and of 
its Eurasian corollary, the One Belt One Road Initiative, or 
OBOR) – and the implications for Germany – will depend 
greatly on the counterstrategy that Germany and the 
EU develop in response, and particularly on the degree 
to which they can coordinate their efforts with the CEE 
countries themselves.
China and Central Eastern Europe: Trade, 
Transport, and China’s Grand Strategy
China established the new cooperation mechanism with 
Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe known as 
the “16+1 Cooperation Framework” in 2012. The forum 
– consisting of China plus 16 Central Eastern and South 
Eastern European countries, both EU members and 
non-members – has developed relatively rapidly into a 
loosely institutionalized form, with secretariat, national 
coordinators, and regular meetings.6 The forum has met 
on a yearly basis since its launch, while bilateral meetings 
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with single members of the forum have been taking place 
between the general meetings to facilitate political and 
economic coordination at the multilateral level.7 Against 
this backdrop, China has launched a number of multilat-
eral initiatives to strengthen cooperation in three areas: 
trade, investment, and transport links.8 For their part, 
many CEE countries have expressed interest in deepening 
relations with China by deepening economic and com-
mercial bilateral ties to improve connectivity in the region 
and eventually gain more strategic leverage vis-à-vis both 
the EU and Russia.9
Trade and investment
While the “16+1” format’s original target of increasing 
total bilateral trade to ninety billion euros by 2015 has not 
been met, trade between the 16 CEE countries and China 
is indeed booming. It reached more than forty billion 
euros that year. It is nonetheless still unclear whether this 
boom has been due to the 16+1 framework or has deeper 
roots. Indeed, the launch of the 16+1 forum seems to have 
had a fairly low impact on the level of Chinese engage-
ment in CEE, as trade was already on the rise before the 
initiative was launched. As figure 1 shows, the sharpest 
increase occurred between 2006 and 2010, when China’s 
total trade with CEE jumped from 18 billion euros in 2006 
to more than 33 billion in 2010.
In terms of investments, by 2015 the level of Chinese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 16 countries was 
still very low compared to Chinese FDI in the EU as a 
whole. (See figure 2.) Cumulative Chinese FDI (from 2000 
to 2015) in the eleven CEE countries that are now EU 
member states had reached slightly more than 3.7 billion 
euros by 2015. In comparison, Chinese FDI in the EU as a 
whole reached almost 65 billion euros in the same period 
and was mainly concentrated in the four big advanced 
economies of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and 
Germany. The level of China’s FDI in CEE has, however, 
increased rapidly since EU enlargement. It accelerated 
during the crisis year 2008, particularly with greenfield 
investments in energy, transportation, and manufactur-
ing. China’s main goal is to gain access to local markets 
while using CEE EU members as the gateway to Western 
European economies. Cheap and skilled labor forces there 
and less regulation make these markets attractive for 
Chinese companies. Investment and trade with non-EU 
members in the Western Balkans have followed a similar 
path. While still relatively low, China’s exports to Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia 
more than doubled between 2004 and 2014, while imports 
from these countries increased sevenfold in the same 
time frame.10
Transport cooperation
The greatest potential for the 16+1 mechanis is likely in 
the transportation sector. Since the establishment of the 
16+1 in 2012, transportation and logistics have become 
the main areas of cooperation, and both China and CEE 
are interested in strengthening regional connectivity.11 
Figure 1: Trade between China and the EU’s eleven CEE member states, 2004–15, in million euros
Source: Author’s own calculations, based on Eurostat data 2004–15
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China considers Poland and Hungary as transhipment 
hubs for overland routes from Russia and Central Asia 
and as part of intermodal corridors from Central Asia (via 
the Black Sea) and the Suez Canal (via the Balkans).13 
While the overland Eurasian corridors are already attract-
ing traffic and the main focus is on streamlining logistic 
services, China’s investments have decisively prioritized 
the Western and Eastern Balkans and target Hungary as 
the logistic and transportation hub for CEE.14
In 2016 China’s biggest shipping company, COSCO, 
finalized the acquisition of the controlling stake of the 
Greek port of Piraeus. Piraeus has become China’s first 
port of call in the Mediterranean for westbound traffic via 
the Suez Canal. As a consequence China has reoriented its 
focus to the hinterland and port infrastructure of the east-
ern Mediterranean and the Balkans. Ports like Thessalon-
iki (Greece), Trieste (Italy), Koper (Slovenia), and Con-
stanta (Romania) have become attractive for China, both 
as transhipping hubs and intermodal gateways to south-
ern Germany and central Europe.15 From some of these 
ports, three EU-backed, pan-European freight corridors 
along the eastern and Western Balkans connect with CEE 
across the Danube plain, converging in Budapest: No. 7 
(Orient/East Mediterranean), No. 9 (Rhein-Danube), and 
No. 6 (Mediterranenan). Hungary’s capital is hence set 
to become the main point of entry from the southeastern 
Mediterranean to Central Europe. This said, bottlenecks 
and some missing links still reduce the corridors’ impact 
in intra-European container traffic, and two of them (Nos. 
7 and 9) will not be finalized and operative before 2018. 
China’s investments in the high-speed railway connection 
between Serbia and Hungary (the so called Europe-China 
Land-Sea Express Line) and in the modernization of the 
rail, road, and port infrastructure in the Balkans and in 
South Eastern Europe (specifically Serbia, Hungary, and 
Romania) aim to complement the European projects, free 
up volumes for freight traffic, and speed up operability of 
the corridors.16
For CEE, China’s investments in the transportation 
sector could accelerate the realization of the long planned 
Baltic-Adriatic-Black Sea Corridor as envisioned in the 
“Riga Guidelines” approved at the Fifth China-Central 
Eastern Europe Summit in November 2016. To this end, a 
new China-CEE fund with a volume of ten billion euros 
has been set up to finance transport infrastructure proj-
ects along the corridor.17 For China, there is apparently 
significant incentive to create integrated logistics services 
operated by Chinese companies and become able to offer 
competitive freight rates for intermodal container traffic 
along multiple routes from Suez, Turkey, and Central 
Figure 2: Chinese FDI (2000–15) in select EU member states and CEE countries, in million euros
                                                                Detail: Chinese FDI (2000–15) in the eleven CEE states now in the EU 
Source: Author’s own calculations, based on Hanemann and Huotari12
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Asia/the Caucasus to Central Europe, southern Germany, 
and the Baltics – part of a bid to reduce the dependence 
on such north European ports as Hamburg, Rotterdam, 
and Antwerp.18 
Hence, the vast region targeted by China in the 16+1 
framework is a geographical “platform” where Chinese 
engagement could complement European financial in-
struments for the development of eastern and southeast-
ern parts of the EU. The harmonization of regional proj-
ects both with continental corridors sponsored by China 
and with European initiatives like the TEN-T Corridors 
has therefore become the core of the recently announced 
China-EU Connectivity Platform.19
China’s grand strategy: Transform CEE into the 
EU’s gateway to Eurasia
All in all, the 16+1 initiative was probably not in itself 
decisive in accelerating bilateral ties between China and 
CEE countries, as trade and investment already started 
increasing before it was launched. It is nonetheless 
undeniable that China’s engagement with this region has 
accelerated dramatically in the past decade. China’s pres-
ence is now well established and offers mutual benefits 
in terms of investment, particularly in the transporta-
tion and energy sector and in commercial opportunities. 
However, the volume of both trade and investments is 
still fairly low. 
There is so far little evidence of a strategic attempt on 
China’s part to “divide” CEE from the rest of the EU – even 
though some ambiguity remains as to the level of the 
EU’s involvement in the 16+1 framework. Rather, China’s 
willingness to create synergies between investment ini-
tiatives part of the 16+1 framework (like the China-CEE 
Fond) and bilateral cooperation mechanisms with the EU 
(like the “Juncker investments plan” for less developed 
regions of Europe) goes in a decisively more cooperative 
direction. For instance, shortly after the Juncker Plan was 
announced, China expressed interest in actively partici-
pating in it; in 2016 Beijing and the EU concluded a techni-
cal agreement allowing Beijing to contribute to the plan 
with up to ten billion euros from China’s New Silk Road 
Investment Fund.20 While still formally separated from 
the 16+1 initiative, the strong focus on infrastructure de-
velopment of both the Juncker Plan and China’s One Belt 
One Road initiative (OBOR, a plan for connecting China 
to Eurasia) make these and other initiatives like the afore-
mentioned Connectivity Platform naturally complementa-
ry to projects in transportation and industrial sectors that 
are part of the 16+1 framework, as underlined by Chinese 
diplomatic officials.21
Ironically, however, increased synergies between EU 
initiatives, the 16+1 framework, and China’s OBOR initia-
tive augment the evolving strategic role China attaches to 
the region, notwithstanding the country’s still moderate 
degree of involvement.
Underestimating the strategic dimension of the 16+1 
initiative would be a mistake, particularly after the 
launch of OBOR in 2013. Before the 16+1 framework was 
launched, China lacked an overarching geo-strategic ori-
entation for framing its deepening engagement with the 
CEE region, and the latter ranked low in China’s foreign 
economic policy priorities. With the 16+1 initiative, China 
came to consider its CEE engagement both as part of the 
country’s “Go Out strategy” (by which it encouraged Chi-
nese companies to become more active abroad, particu-
larly on the European market) and, most prominently, as 
an instrument to engage the EU while strengthening the 
partnership in a difficult economic period for many EU 
Table 1: Germany-V4 trade compared to cumulated trade with the UK, Italy, and France, 2015, in billion US dollars
Germany’s export, import, and trade turnover with Visegrad countries, bilateral and cumulated
Export Import Export + Import 
 Poland 42,886
52,261
95,147
Czech Republic 36,564 50,567 87,131
Hungary 23,589 27,344 50,933
Slovakia 11,615 16,841 28,456
Cumulated Trade Turnover 114,654 147,013 233,211
UK, France, and Italy’s cumulated export, import, and trade turnover with Visegrad countries
Export Import Export + Import 
Visegrad Countries 50,807 80,514 131,321
 
Source: Author’s own calculations, based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics, 2015
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members.22 When OBOR was launched in 2013, however, 
the 16+1 format became a de facto part of that initiative 
– widening the format’s strategic horizon in scope and 
giving it a more distinctive geopolitical tone.23 
While before the launch of the OBOR, CEE was seen 
largely as a bridgehead connecting to the EU’s eastern 
edge, now China could begin to regard the CEE “sub-
region” increasingly as a key bridge to link both the 
region and the EU at large into an interconnecting 
Eurasia.24 Sustained cooperation in the transportation 
sector and a strong Chinese focus on connectivity support 
this statement. Even in this case, however, enhancing 
and strengthening connectivity and trade ties with a 
region where China is a relative newcomer (and Chinese 
companies barely know the market) still makes the EU 
and its regulatory instruments an indispensable partner 
for China. Considered from this perspective, even in a 
broader and more geopolitical scope, the 16+1 initiative 
and its Eurasian equivalent OBOR have the potential to 
engage and complement the EU while turning CEE into 
Europe’s gateway to Eurasia. Whether or not this holds 
true will depend more on the EU than on China, however.
An Emerging Trade Triangle:  
China and the German-Central European 
Manufacturing Core
In the long run, China’s quiet but steadily rising penetration 
of CEE could indeed bear risks for the EU. It could exacer-
bate structural economic transformations already occurring 
inside Europe, widen geo-economic divisions, and eventually 
heighten political tensions between Germany on the one side 
and other European partners like France and Italy on the other 
regarding the future of the EU’s political-economic architec-
ture. Indeed, rather than consider the China-CEE relationship 
in bilateral terms, it is helpful to view it through a triangular 
prism of China, Germany, and the leading CEE economies. This 
highlights Germany’s crucial role in trade relations with both 
China and the economically strongest CEE countries, par-
ticularly, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic 
(collectively known as the Visegrad Group, or V4). 
As Table 1 shows, in 2015 German trade with the V4 out-
paced the cumulated trade of France, the UK, and Italy with 
the same four countries. The V4’s trade with both Germany 
and other EU member states is mostly concentrated in 
mid to high value-added manufacturing goods (parts and 
components of vehicles, electrical machineries, and indus-
trial machineries.)25 This is largely intra-industrial trade. 
However, the much higher volumes of intra-industrial goods 
traded between V4 and Germany points to a much higher 
concentration of cross-border manufacturing activity and 
supply chains in the German-Central-Eastern European 
sphere. As confirmed in different studies, there is increas-
ing evidence for the emergence in this region of a “Central 
European Manufacturing Core,” a joint geo-economic 
production platform with Germany (and partially, Austria) 
at its center.26 
In this German-Central European manufacturing core, 
integration in regional value chains and trade openness 
that followed the EU’s enlargement in 2004 have helped 
the V4 maintain high manufacturing shares of GDP.27 
They have exceptionally profited from their vertical 
integration in Germany’s supply and value chains, helping 
them accelerate their respective catch-up processes. 
Conversely, it seems that global value chains have 
hastened “deindustrialization paths” in other advanced 
European economies like the UK, France, and Italy.28 
These have lost manufacturing and trade shares and have 
been suffering a prolonged period of stagnating growth 
following the European economic crisis as compared to 
both Germany and the V4 countries. For instance, the 
German-driven “core” alone produced 42 percent of the 
total EU manufacturing exports in 2011, when the Euro-
pean economic and debt crisis hit Italy and France par-
ticularly forcefully, accelerating their path of deindustri-
alization and trade contraction.29 Against the backdrop of 
a structural shift out of manufacturing – one that is much 
less pronounced in Germany and the V4 than in countries 
like France, Italy, and Spain – an increasing divergence 
has also emerged in economic performance between 
the German-driven “core” and the Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean “periphery.” This was amplified by the economic 
and financial crisis that began in 2008; from 2008 to 2014, 
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity has grown 
comparably stronger in both Germany and the V4 than in 
the stagnating economies of Atlantic and Mediterranean 
Europe, even though the V4 started from a considerably 
lower GDP level.30
When viewed against this backdrop, China’s engage-
ment in CEE gains a distinctive relevance. This becomes 
even clearer if we look at the distribution of China’s trade 
with CEE by country and by product. In CEE, Beijing 
has clearly prioritized the countries that are part of the 
German-Central European manufacturing core.
Figures 1 and 2 show a great concentration of both 
investments and trade in at least three of the four Viseg-
rad countries, where almost half of China’s trade turnover 
with the region and half of its FDI are concentrated.31 Of 
these, Poland and the Czech Republic are China’s main 
trade partners in the region, while Hungary receives the 
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biggest share of FDI. The V4 countries already import 
from China complex, high value-added manufacturing 
goods (electrical machinery, mechanical equipment, and 
parts and components thereof) – more than they do from 
other big European countries, with the exception of Ger-
many.32 Meanwhile, while the EU as a whole still receives 
the largest volume of V4 exports – due largely to the intra-
industrial trade with Germany’s dominant economy – the 
V4’s export and import trade with Asia has grown more 
dynamically. In it, China takes the lion’s share both in 
imports and exports, with trade mainly concentrated in 
electronic machinery parts and components.33
As for Germany, the regional structure of its trade has 
been steadily shifting from Western Europe toward CEE 
and Asia. While the EU and the eurozone remain the 
main destination for German goods, ties with developing 
countries outside of the EU – particularly China – have 
grown much more dynamically than intra-European ties. 
Today, German trade with China outpaces trade between 
China and every other European advanced economy, with 
particularly strong manufacturing and intra-industrial 
trade.34 As a result, in the first 11 months of 2016, China 
has become Germany’s first trade partner, outpacing for 
the first time the United States and France. While the 
latter two are still the main destinations of Germany’s 
exports, their position has been eroding in recent years. 
On a year-to-year basis, for example, German exports 
to China rose by 5.5 percent between 2015 and 2016 as 
compared to a 1.7 percent decrease in exports to France 
and a 6.3 percent decrease in exports to the US in the 
same period. In terms of trade regions, the cumulated 
export share to both non-eurozone countries (which 
includes three of four Visegrad countries) and Asia (39.2 
percent) is already higher than export to the eurozone 
(36.8 percent) and to America (12.2 percent).35 This fact 
points to an increased German dependence on Asian and 
Chinese markets, which largely contributed to Germany’s 
sustained export surpluses and growth performance 
compared to the rest of Europe.36 Hence both Germany 
and the V4 have become much more independent of intra-
European trade and domestic shocks.
Three factors in particular suggest the emergence of 
a triangular relationship: 1) China’s increased (vertical) 
trade with both Germany and the V4, 2) the V4’s sus-
tained trade deficits with China, and 3) the region’s high 
trade exchange and trade surplus with Germany. While 
the Visegrad countries mainly import computer and tele-
communications devices from China, a rising portion 
of their imports consists of parts and components (such 
as electric motors or insulated wires and circuits for 
both cars and industrial electrical machineries). While 
a more in-depth analysis of input-output data is needed 
for the analysis of a process that is only just beginning 
and whose data are hard to isolate, we can assume that a 
part of China’s export in the V4 is increasingly processed 
in the regions’ production chains, inputted as intermedi-
ate goods, mainly re-exported to Germany, and eventu-
ally exported from there as parts of finished products.37 
Hence, while this triangle is still in a very early stage, it 
seems that the V4 increasingly serves as an emerging 
production platform linking Germany with China and 
the rest of East Asia.
Geopolitical Risks and Germany’s Special 
Responsibilities
China’s steadily increasing engagement in CEE is driven 
by an economic and geo-economic logic. This logic is not 
necessarily at odds with European interests, as Chinese 
investment in the region increases connectivity and 
fosters market integration. China’s involvement in CEE, 
particularly through the “16+1” cooperation mechanism, 
does not follow a “divisive” strategy per se. Beijing shows 
little interest in weakening the EU per se and is aware of 
the extent to which it needs Brussels’s stabilizing pres-
ence in a region where it is itself quite new on the scene. 
Indeed, Beijing’s primary goal in CEE is to use the region 
as transportation gateway and commercial platform to 
Western Europe’s markets in an effort to integrate the EU 
into its Eurasian grand strategy. Geopolitically, China’s 
engagement in both CEE and Eurasia might give the EU, 
Germany, and CEE the chance to counterbalance Russia 
while increasing their own strategic, political, and eco-
nomic leverage in Eurasia.
The developments call for wariness, however. China’s 
inroads into CEE could become a dividing factor, one that 
may move the “German-Central Eastern European manu-
facturing core” away from the rest of the EU. This would 
involve the combination of several factors: 1) stagnating 
or slowly growing economies in Atlantic and southern 
Europe, 2) deepening divergences between Germany, 
France and (to a lesser extent) Italy, on the future of the 
EU’s political economy, specifically on the role of public 
budget debts, public spending, economic competitiveness 
and export trade unbalances, 3) a deepening dependence 
of both Germany and the V4 on extra-EU and Asian trade, 
and 4) the convergence in this region of new China-spon-
sored Eurasian maritime and land routes. Taken together, 
these factors could indeed produce a stronger effect than 
China deliberately intends.
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More broadly, without a coordinated strategy to 
engage China at both European and regional levels, the 
“inroads” China is making into CEE could amplify the 
challenges both Germany and the EU will have to face as 
Eurasian ties deepen and transatlantic and intra-Euro-
pean ties potentially weaken. Due to Germany’s crucial 
importance both inside and outside the EU, its govern-
ment in particular must balance the different potential 
trade-offs carefully. Specifically, as the US under Presi-
dent Donald Trump becomes more inward looking and 
protectionist, negotiations on free trade agreements such 
as TPP and TTIP look less and less likely.38 In post-Brexit 
Europe, Germany’s trade-friendly position may become 
more isolated if protectionism spreads to the weakening 
economies of Atlantic and Mediterranean Europe and 
relations with Russia remain strained. Against this back-
drop, deepening ties to China could be seen as a natural 
option for both Germany and the Visegrad countries.
For Germany, China is a vital trade partner and final 
destination for its goods. Much more, it could potentially 
turn into a natural ally as it struggles to advocate open 
markets and free trade across the Eurasian continent and 
in Asia. China has already expressed its willingness to 
become the champion of open markets and free trade in 
the Asia Pacific region and in Eurasia, proposing a series 
of alternatives to the US-sponsored free trade agreements 
TTIP and TPP, which is now all but dead under Trump’s 
administration.39
Particularly in Eurasia, China could serve Germany 
as a geopolitical alternative to Russia. While it is widely 
understood that Moscow seeks to establish a strategic 
axis with Beijing as an alternative to Europe based on 
a “partnership among equals” to build a more integrated 
Eurasia, China, on the contrary, could well be skeptical 
of the idea.40 Surely, in pursuing its goal of building a 
more integrated Eurasia, China must question the logic 
of partnering with an ailing and revisionist power intent 
on forging an “anti-Western” alliance that targets both 
the US and Europe. Much more, Beijing presumably sees 
advantages of strengthening its ties with the EU and 
Germany, as it needs both to realize its Eurasian project 
and modernize its economy.41 Hence, strengthening eco-
nomic and transportation ties along different corridors in 
CEE and across Eurasia is conducive to both German and 
Chinese interests.
Within Central Europe, nationalist governments such 
as those of Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party in Hungary and 
the PiS party in Poland increasingly oppose Brussels but 
continue to pursue strong economic ties with Germany 
in the short to middle run as part of the “manufactur-
ing core.” Where, then, do they stand on China? It is 
possible that Poland might be tempted to use China as 
an “external balancer” to both the EU and Russia, par-
ticularly if Russian-American rapprochement takes place 
under Trump. Warsaw might in the long run also hope to 
establish China as an alternative trade partner to Ger-
many. Hungary or the Czech Republic, too, might follow 
the same path, seeing China as a less problematic political 
partner than Russia and economically a potential alterna-
tive to Germany and the EU. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Chinese engagement in Central, Eastern, and South 
Eastern Europe could in the absence of a coordinated 
approach carry risks for Germany, for CEE countries, and 
for the EU as a whole. Any efforts by CEE countries to 
establish China as an alternative to Germany might prove 
a long-term task; residents of CEE might find themselves 
more and more dependent on Beijing, with trade deficits 
rapidly rising but without any guarantee that Beijing 
would commit to serving as an “external balancer” or 
offer an alternative to Germany’s stable, rule-based 
economic cooperation. For Germany, China’s attempt to 
move up along the manufacturing value chain and take 
advantage of the “digital revolution” could in the mid to 
long run turn Beijing into a powerful competitor on the 
global markets – and CEE into a contested geo-economic 
space between German and Chinese companies.42 In fact, 
Beijing might try to turn CEE into its own production plat-
form, further deepening divisions both inside the EU and, 
in the long run, in Germany’s relations with CEE. Against 
this backdrop, selling cutting-edge technological know-
how to China without a clear regulatory and investment 
framework based on reciprocity could prove detrimental 
for Germany.
German policy makers could face a dilemma in this 
scenario. Siding with China and supporting open markets 
and free trade vis-à-vis the increasingly protectionist 
stance of both the United States and Western Europe 
would increase Berlin’s isolation and further weaken 
the EU’s institutions. If Germany instead became more 
protectionist vis-à-vis China, there could be substantial 
losses for German companies and, indirectly, for the CEE 
countries that are tied to them.
To counter such possible developments, Germany must 
start an ambitious and comprehensive triple-edged strat-
egy. This should begin with greater engagement in CEE 
countries but should not be limited to the region:
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First, it should work with CEE countries (especially 
the V4) as well as with other major European countries 
and EU institutions to forge a deeper and more effective 
cooperation with China in the CEE “common platform” 
for enhancing transport connectivity and economic 
modernization, particularly in the Western and Eastern 
Balkans. If the 16+1 framework fails to effectively include 
both the EU and Germany in common, concrete projects, 
then a consultative platform could be established involv-
ing the V4, China, Germany, and the EU in a “4+3” format. 
This could help set common rules and standards for joint 
investments that could, moreover, then serve as a bench-
mark in regions of Eurasia. A similar scope could serve 
the cooperation mechanism for the Western Balkans pro-
posed by Germany in 2014 and which could be extended 
to China. 
Second, within the framework of the planned EU-Chi-
na investment agreement, Germany should increase its 
pressure on the Chinese government for further opening 
up the Chinese domestic market and guaranteeing Ger-
many and the European Union access to China’s compa-
nies and assets.43 
Third, Germany should commit to an initiative at the 
EU level focused on new and forward-looking European 
industrial politics centered on the digitalization of value 
and supply chains, based on Germany’s “Industrie 4.0” 
initiative and aimed to close the manufacturing gap 
inside Europe
In conclusion, Germany needs to approach Chinese 
involvement in Central and Eastern Europe with a multi-
pronged, proactive strategy that simultaneously targets 
CEE, the EU, and China. Only if it does so will Germany 
be able to prevent intra-European divisions from deepen-
ing, take advantage of triangular relations with CEE and 
China, and foster mutually advantageous integration 
across Eurasia.
Jacopo Maria Pepe is associate fellow at the DGAP’s 
Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, 
Russia, and Central Asia and is currently a visiting scholar 
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ter for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s 
School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
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